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The U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL) received the first salvos in the battle for cybersecurity as early 
as three decades ago. In terms of technology history, it was an astonishingly long time ago. Before most 
people ever heard of the Internet. Before there were web browsers. Long before the smartphones. Back 
in 1986, the laboratory withstood attacks by Markus Hess, a Soviet-sponsored hacker who had 
successfully penetrated dozens of U.S. military computer sites. In his bestselling book, The Cuckoo’s Egg, 
the pioneering U.S. cyber defender, Cliff Stoll, describes how he monitored the hacker’s networks 
activities in the fall of 1986: “He then tried the Army’s Ballistic Research Lab’s computers in Aberdeen, 
Maryland. The Milnet took only a second to connect, but BRL’s passwords defeated him: he couldn’t get 
through” (Stoll 1989). 
Two years later, the laboratory faced the legendary Morris Worm. ”Around midnight on November 3, 
1988, system managers at the Army’s Ballistic Research Laboratory noticed their computers slowing 
down to a crawl as the worm stole precious computing processing time. Fearing a foreign attack, they 
pulled their computers off the nationwide network predating the Internet, called ARPAnet.” (Hess, 2016)  
 
The Army’s Ballistic Research Lab, an ancestor of ARL, was the home of the ENIAC, the world’s first 
electronic digital computer in 1946. It was also where the “ping” program was written in 1983, and 
where many other milestones of computing and networking took place. The encounters with the Soviet-
sponsored hacker and with the Morris Worm were among such milestones.  
Since those early beginnings, the history of ARL’s efforts in cyber defense was exciting and challenging 
(Fig. 1). Although ARL is the Army’s corporate laboratory that focuses on fundamental and early applied 
research (in the Department of Defense lingo – the research of 6.1 and early 6.2 types), the fundamental 
science endeavors are closely integrated with extensive operationally-oriented programs. These range 
from providing continuous cybersecurity defense services to multiple organizations, as well as cyber 
survivability and vulnerability analysis of Army systems.    
 Fig. 1 ARL cyber research was informed by real-world environment 
An important feature of ARL’s business model is the great degree of collaboration with the academic 
community. One example is the Cyber Collaborative Research Alliance (CRA) (McDaniel and Swami 2016) 
that brings together, in closely integrated collaborative projects, ARL scientists with academic 
researchers from dozens of U.S. universities. Cyber CRA aims to develop the fundamental science of 
cyber detection, risk, agility, as well as the overarching challenge of human factors in cyber security. 
Similarly, the Network Science Collaborative Technology Alliance (see http://www.ns-cta.org/) 
integrates ARL and academic research efforts towards a broad understanding of how multi-genre 
networks of humans and information and communications devices influence each other and undergo 
complex dynamic transformations.  
ARL collaborations are not limited to U.S. universities. ARL is also actively engaged with international 
partners.  ARL’s Open Campus business model (http://www.arl.army.mil/www/default.cfm?page=2357) 
helps such wide-ranged collaborations by providing facilities and organizational support for enabling 
scientists and engineers from the U.S. and abroad to come to ARL for a period of time to work in 
partnership with ARL scientists.  
Complementing its close ties with academic scientists, ARL research is also intertwined with practical, 
day-to-day operational responsibilities. Scientists are in direct communications with cyber analysts from 
the ARL Cybersecurity Service Provider (CSSP), a Tier II organization that defends networks of hundreds 
of customers belonging to all U.S. Military services, other government organizations, and even industrial 
entities (e.g.,  Oniha et al 2016). ARL has a strong reputation in the area of threat analysis and forensics. 
The laboratory’s experts in these fields are in high demand as they support cyber-related investigations 
conducted by law enforcement and counter-intelligence bodies.  Vulnerability and survivability 
assessments of systems and networks that are either already deployed or are still in acquisition process, 
are another major area of ARL practical, hands-on contributions to Army cybersecurity (Acosta et al 
2016). ARL’s highly experienced teams of experts perform Cooperative Vulnerability and Penetration 
Assessments (blue team assessments) as well as Adversarial Assessments (red team assessments). 
Practical operational insights and needs obtained in operational activities are provided to scientists. 
They, in turn, utilize observations and data to develop new theories and models, and eventually to 
develop tools that transition into operational use.  
Although participants of a broad cyber research community, ARL cyber scientists are largely driven by 
challenges unique to the ground operations of the Army. A key example is the exceptionally large attack 
surface of Army networks: the Army operates in environments within close proximity to allied and 
civilian assets and adversaries, comprising a complex cyber ecosystem. Forward-deployed network 
assets are vulnerable to cyber entry or physical capture and subversion of information and devices. 
Another distinct feature of Army cyber environments is the relatively disadvantaged assets, as the 
Soldiers’ computing and communication devices are energy and weight constrained, with limited 
bandwidth and computational capacity.  Large number of nodes and fast changes of Army cyber 
environments are also quite distinct. Soldiers operate in a mobile environment, in complex terrain, with 
rapidly changing connectivity. Lastly, these networks are often interspersed with civilian, allied, and 
adversarial networks.  
These challenges inform and focus of ARL’s research areas. One key area of research is the 
understanding the cyber threat.  The topics in this area range from inferring influences and relations 
within a command and control organization from its encrypted communications, to novel uses of 
stylometry for identifying authors or origins of malware (Caliskan-Islam and Harang 2015), to tools and 
techniques for forensic analysis, and even to the study of cultural factors and personality that influence 
patterns of behaviors of cyber actors (Cho et al 2016).   
Understanding the threats contributes to the characterization of risk experienced by a system or 
network. ARL’s research in risk characterization includes such topics as statistical analysis of factors 
affecting the anticipated frequency of successful cyber attacks (Gil et al 2014), and theoretical 
approaches to network risk computation (Cam 2015). It also includes applied efforts to develop better 
procedures for risk inspection programs; tools for continuous monitoring of risk, cyber situational 
awareness (Kott et al 2014), and decision support systems for cyber risk assessments.   
Knowing the risks helps focus the detection efforts (Kott and Arnold 2013). The comprehensive portfolio 
of ARL’s research in detection of hostile cyber activities is based on close integration with practical 
network defense operations. It provides data and insights, and leads to the study of topics like the 
impact of packet loss in realistic cyber sensors on effectiveness of intrusion detection (Smith et al 2016). 
Other topics include special challenges of detection in cyber physical systems (Colbert 2016, Colbert and 
Kott 2016); use of machine learning for detection methods suitable for mobile, resource-constrained 
devices (Harang et al 2015, Harang 2016); cognitive models of human analyst’s process of detection 
(Acosta et al 2016); and synergistic approaches to human-machine intrusion detection (Ben-Asher and 
Yu 2016).     
Ultimately, whether detected or not, the hostile cyber activities must be defeated. ARL explores 
approaches such as active cyber defense (Marvel et al 2014), post-intrusion triage for optimized 
recovery (Mell and Harang 2014), and cyber maneuvers that limit lateral propagation of hostile malware 
(Ben-Asher et al 2016).  
These research projects are supported by a network of experimental facilities and laboratories 
dedicated to cyber research. For example, the ARL Cybersecurity Service Provider performs double duty: 
it supports large-scale operational cyber defense, but also acts as a laboratory for collection of real-
world data for research, and a platform for insertion and testing of novel cyber defense tools continually 
invented and developed by ARL scientists.  
Another example of a laboratory is the virtual laboratory called CyberVAN. It is an environment for 
design and execution of cyber experiments using virtual machines, real Army applications, and a 
network simulator capable of realistic portrayal of sizeable Army units in mobile operations in complex 
terrain.   CyberVAN is particularly well suited for experimental validation of theoretical results by 
academic researchers, including international collaborators.  
Additionally, the Army Cyber-research and Analytics Laboratory at ARL serves as an environment that 
supports various industrial and federally-funded partners of ARL. Its functions range: personnel training, 
product integration, systems engineering, and integrated testing using real-world data. The CHIMERA 
laboratory specializes in the study of human factors and human-information interactions in cyber 
defense; it helps to explore the human dimension of cybersecurity.  
All this research yields results, many of which transitioned to practice as tools and systems. For example, 
Interrogator is an ARL-developed suite of network monitoring, intrusion detection and intrusion analysis 
tools. Used at ARL, as well as at a number of other organizations, its architecture is optimized for 
government cyber security operations, for defense against sophisticated threats, and for rapid insertion 
of research tools as plug-ins. Another example, Interrogator-in-a-Box, was developed for defense of 
mobile tactical networks.  In addition, DShell is a framework for forensic analysis, popular with users at 
government agencies. ARL researchers attracted multiple, valuable international collaborators – and a 
good number of comments on social media – when they developed an open-source version of DShell 
and placed it on GitHub (see GitHub.com/USArmyResearchLab). Other examples of practical tools 
developed at ARL include COBWebS, a simulation tool that incorporate cyber warfare elements into 
training exercises, and a decision support tool for cybersecurity assessments, which helps perform 
assessments using public knowledge sources and custom data. 
 
Looking further out, our long-term campaign of cyber research is guided by the vision of the future Army 
battlefield. In the year 2040, it will be a highly converged virtual-physical space, where cyber operations 
will be an integral part of the fight (Kott et al 2015). Cyber fires are the activities that will degrade, 
disrupt, deny, deceive and destroy not only informational, computational and communication resources 
of the adversary, but also the physical capabilities of its platforms, weapons, robots, munitions, and 
even of personnel. Cyber maneuver refer to activities that will rapidly move and transform the friendly 
informational-computational resources to deny the adversary an opportunity to attack, while imposing 
on him a new unsolvable problem (Fig. 2). Cyber fires and maneuver will rely on effective cyber 
intelligence collection capabilities.  
Operating on multiple time scales, often far faster than human cognitive processes, in a highly dynamic, 
non-contiguous battlefield, these fires and maneuvers will join the conventional, kinetic fires and 
movements. Future cyber capabilities will have to support continuous (real-time, not just deliberate) 
planning and execution  of highly agile, daring, aggressive cyber fires and maneuvers This will be 
performed in a way that is necessarily highly automated and reliant on machine intelligence, and  yet 
responsive to human intent and guidance. 
 
Fig. 2 ARL cyber research is increasingly focused on cyber fires and maneuvers in tactical environments 
For these reasons, our cyber research efforts will increasingly focus on developing the models, methods, 
and understanding to overcome existing barriers to the realization of effective cyber fires and 
maneuvers in a tactical environment. The goals of this work are to pursue near-autonomous detection 
and identification of malicious activity directed at friendly networks; methods to rapidly respond to 
adversarial activities; predictive characterization of network vulnerabilities; and a robust framework to 
assess networks. Moreover, our research program will focus on the realization of methodologies for the 
reliable reconfiguration of friendly cyber assets to evade or recover from attack; covert means for 
collection and predictive analysis of enemy actions; and methodologies to degrade or destroy 
adversarial cyber assets with high certainty and predictable probabilities of success.  
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